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Trucking, a New Mexico Corporation, pray that a Writ of
Certiorari be issued to review a judgment and opinion of the
Court of Appeals of Utah entered September 13, 1990.
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OPINION BELOW
Gaw v. Linqle,

P.2d

(Utah Ct. App. 1990) was

decided September 13, 1990. A copy of the opinion is attached
hereto and incorporated by reference as Exhibit "A".

JURISDICTION
Under Rule 48(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a
Petition for Writ of Certiorari may be filed with the Clerk of
this Court within 30 days of entry of a decision by the Court
of Appeals of Utah.

The date of the decision by the Court of

Appeals is September 13, 1990.

PARTIES
Fay Gaw was the Plaintiff at trial, and Appellant
before the Utah Court of Appeals.
Jimmy Wray Lingle and Roadrunner Trucking were
Defendants at trial, and Respondents before the Court of Appeals
of Utah.

2

The State of Utah was a party before the trial court,
but was granted Summary Judgment prior to trial.

Fay Gaw also

appealed the grant of Summary Judgment.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(CASES)
Gaw v. State of Utah,
P.2d
(Utah Ct. App. 1990), attached as Exhibit "A"

.....

4, 5, 7

Hall v. Warren, 632 P.2d 848 (Utah 1981)

7

Joraensen v. Issa, 739 P.2d 80,82 (Utah Ct. App. 1987),
attached as Exhibit "B"

6

(RULES)
Rule 46, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

6

Rule 48, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

2

(COLLATERAL SOURCES)
Restatement (Second) of Torts, §288A (1965)
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the violation of a statute, designed to

avoid the type of injury which occurred, is negligence per se,
prima facia evidence of negligence, or something else?
2.

Whether the Utah Court of Appeals properly

characterized the instruction in question in this case as
negligence per se?
3.

Whether the giving of the instruction in question

constituted harmless error?
3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a personal injury case which went to trial for
several days in the Seventh Judicial District Court for Carbon
County.
On April 16, 1984, the plaintiff, Fay Gaw, pulled out
from a stop sign on a side street, directly into the path of a
semi-tractor-trailer travelling southbound on a main highway,
State Road 6, near Helper, Carbon County, Utah.

She was well

familiar with the intersection. TR 599-600, 593, 596, 585-86,
597, 587, 598.

The day was clear and the roads were dry.

TR at

554 and 566.
The intersection provided a lane for traffic travelling
the path which plaintiff intended to travel, that is, for
traffic leaving Helper from the side road, and turning left
(South) onto Highway 6.

The lane did not even merge into

southbound traffic on Highway 6 but continued south until it
became a lane of its own.

TR at 655-659; Exhibits of the

Highway Configuration at trial; Gaw v. State of Utah,

P.2d

(Utah Ct. App. 1990), Slip Opinion at 1, attached as
Exhibit "A".
Rather than travel down the appropriate lane just
described, with which she was very familiar, the plaintiff
continued to cross the highway, intending to turn left, and
drove into the path of the semi-tractor-trailer, the driver of
4

which tried to avert the collision.

TR at 655-659; Exhibits of

the Highway Configuration at trial; Gaw v. State of Utah, above,
Slip Opinion at 1.

The plaintiff sustained serious injuries.

At trial certain instructions were given concerning the
plaintiff's conduct, which were the subject of the appeal to the
Court of Appeals in Utah.

See Gaw v. State of Utah, above, Slip

Opinion at 3, 5-8.
At the end of the trial, the jury returned a verdict
that the plaintiff was 75% negligent, and the defendants, Lingle
and Roadrunner Trucking, were 25% negligent. Gaw v. State of
Utah, above, Slip Opinion at 2.
The State of Utah had been dismissed from the case
prior to trial on the State's motion for summary judgment.

Gaw

v. State of Utah, above, Slip Opinion at 2.
The Court of Appeals found that one of the
instructions, concerning the plaintiff's alleged contributory
negligence, constituted an instruction of negligence per se
which was reversible error. The Court of Appeals failed to
consider the fact that other instructions gave the jury complete
discretion to determine the percentage of fault attributable to
each party including attributing a minimum amount of fault to
the plaintiff.

The case was remanded for a new trial.

5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case and another decision of the Utah Court of
Appeals have come to contrary conclusions concerning whether
violation of a statute, designed to protect against the injury
involved, is negligence per se.

In this case, the Court of

Appeals admitted that Utah Appellate Courts have confused the
issue of law in question.

ARGUMENT
Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
provides some of the types of reasons that will be considered by
this honorable Court as grounds for issuing a Writ of
Certiorari.

Rule 46(a) states:

When a panel of the
rendered a decision
decision of another
Appeals on the same

Court of Appeals has
in conflict with a
panel of the Court of
issue of law.

In the present case, the Court of Appeals of Utah
rendered a decision in direct conflict with a recent prior
decision of the Court of Appeals of Utah on the same issue of
law.
In Jorqensen v. Issa, 739 P.2d 80 (Utah App. 1987),
attached as Exhibit "B," the court of appeals stated that
violation of a statute is negligence per se:
. . . [I]t is well established that violation
of a statute or ordinance is negligence per se
6

which may be excused if the negligent actor is
confronted with an emergency not his own
fault. Hall v. Warren, 632 P.2d 848, 851 (Utah
1981); Restatement (Second) of Torts, §288A
(1965).
Id. at 82.
In the opinion in this case, Gaw v. Linqle, above, the
Court of Appeals held that the violation of a statute may be
considered only as evidence of negligence and is not negligence
per se.

Slip Opinion at 6.

Because of the instruction in

question, the verdict was vacated and the case remanded for
trial.
In Gaw v. State of Utah, above, the Appellate Court
admitted that confusion exists on the issue in the Appellate
Courts of Utah:
The parties disagree about whether the
violation of statute or ordinance, such as
occurred when Gaw made her illegal turn onto
Highway 6, constitutes "per se" or "prima
facia" negligence in Utah. Their confusion is
not surprising because Utah Appellate Courts
have also occasionally confused these terms.
Id., Slip Opinion, at 5 (Emphasis added).
CONCLUSION
In view of the recognized confusion in the Appellate
Courts of Utah, and the existence of contrary decisions within
the Court of Appeals, a Writ of Certiorari should issue to the

7

Court of Appeals in this case, and all issues in the case
reviewed.
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Fay Gaw,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

OPINION
(For Publication)

v.
State of Utah, by and through
its Department of
Transportation: Carbon County;
City of Helper; Jimmy Wray
Lingle; Allstate Ins. Company,
an Illinois Corp.; Roadrunner
Trucking, a New Mexico Corp.;
and John Does I through X,

Case No. 890139-CA

Defendants and Appellees.

Seventh District, Carbon County
The Honorable Boyd Bunnell
Attorneys: Robert J. Debry, Edward T. Wells, Daniel F. Bertch,
Gordon K. Jensen, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Jody K. Burnett and Joy L. Sanders, Salt Lake City,
for Department of Transportation
Robert R. Wallace and Scott F. Squire, Salt Lake
City, for Roadrunner Trucking

Before Judges Davidson,1 Bullock,2 and Orme.
ORME, Judge:
On April 16, 1984, Fay Gaw was turning left from a side
street onto Highway 6 in Helper, Utah. Gaw apparently drove
across a merge lane and into the through lane of traffic when
she was hit by a truck driven by Jimmy Wray Lingle and owned by
Roadrunner Trucking. Gaw was paralyzed from the chest down as
1. Judge Davidson concurred in this opinion prior to his
resignation effective September 1, 1990.
2. J. Robert Bullock, Senior District Judge, sitting by
special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10)
(1990) .

a result of the accident. She brought suit against Lingle
claiming that he had negligently operated the truck and against
Roadrunner as the employer of Lingle, She also brought suit
against the State of Utah claiming that the intersection was
negligently designed, constructed and maintained.3
On January 30, 1986, Gaw's deposition was taken at the
instance of Lingle. The court reporter transcribed the
testimony and delivered a copy of the deposition to Gaw's
attorney. On March 14, Gaw received a sheet from the reporter
on which to make appropriate corrections to her deposition. In
May, Gaw's attorney sought and obtained an extension of time to
correct the deposition and file it with the court. Gaw made
approximately fifty changes to her deposition, which were filed
with the deposition in June 1986.
In July 1986, defendants moved to suppress the changes in
Gaw's deposition, claiming that the corrections were not made
in compliance with Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 30(e), that Gaw
had given a false excuse for making substantial changes to the
deposition, and that the changes would prejudice the
defendants. In February 1988, the court granted defendants1
motions and suppressed the changes to Gaw's deposition.
In March 1988, the state filed a motion for summary
judgment. Gaw filed a motion in opposition along with her own
affidavit and the affidavits of two engineers who stated their
opinions that the intersection was faultily designed. The
trial court granted the state's motion for summary judgment,
finding that Gaw had failed to produce any evidence that the
intersection was faultily designed or that such design had
caused the accident.
In September 1988, a jury trial was held to determine the
liability of Lingle and Roadrunner. On special verdict, the
jury found Gaw 75% liable for the accident and Lingle 25%
liable.
During the trial, Gaw attempted to admit testimony from a
"human factors" expert to the effect that Gaw had behaved in a
reasonable and prudent manner and that Lingle had not behaved
reasonably under the circumstances. The trial court did not
allow the expert to testify in conclusory legal terms about the
3. Gaw brought suit against other defendants, but they were
dismissed from the case and are not parties to this appeal.

reasonableness of the parties' actions. It did, however, allow
the expert to testify extensively about the misleading nature
of the intersection, the likelihood that Gaw was confused by
the intersection markings, and the distinction between her
subjective and objective confusion.
Defendants submitted three proposed jury instructions,
each of which stated that the conduct described in the
instructions "is negligence." Gaw objected to these
instructions because they effectively incorporated a standard
of per se negligence contrary to Utah law,4 The court noted
Gaw's objection but gave the instructions as tendered.
On appeal, Gaw raises three arguments. First, Gaw argues
that the court improperly limited the testimony of her human
factors expert. Second, Gaw challenges the jury instructions
to which she objected below. Finally, Gaw argues that the
court improperly granted summary judgment to the state,
primarily due to the court's decision to suppress the changes
Gaw sought to make to her deposition. We affirm in part,
reverse in part, and remand for a new trial.
EXPERT TESTIMONY
Gaw challenges the trial court's decision prohibiting the
human factors expert from testifying that Gaw's actions before
the accident constituted reasonable, prudent conduct.5 In
order to prevail on this issue, Gaw must demonstrate that the
trial court abused its discretion in excluding the expert
testimony. Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co., 781 P.2d 445, 447
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). Moreover, she must demonstrate that "the
4. Gaw also objected to one of the instructions because it did
not state Lingle's duty of reasonable care within the
instruction. Lingle's duty was adequately defined in other
jury instructions and, therefore, we find this argument to be
without merit.
5. Gaw also argues that the trial court excluded testimony
concerning the reasonableness of Lingle's conduct. However,
the court made no specific ruling on that aspect of the
expert's testimony. Thus, nothing in the record suggests that
Gaw's expert was prohibited from discussing the reasonableness
of Lingle's conduct. Gaw cannot challenge a ruling the court
did not make.
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excluded evidence would probably have had a substantial
influence in bringing about a different verdict."
Redevelopment Aaencv v. Tanner, 740 P.2d 1296, 1303-04 (Utah
1987) .
The Utah Rules of Evidence provide that a witness who has
been qualified as an expert may testify "[i]f scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue." Utah R. Evid. 702. Moreover, that testimony may
embrace "an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of
fact." Utah R. Evid. 704.
As a general rule, it is within the discretion of the
trial court to determine whether a particular expert is
qualified and whether particular testimony would be helpful and
suitable in a particular case. Ostler, 781 P.2d at 447.
However, the trial court does not properly exercise that
discretion where its decision is based upon a misconception of
law.
In re Carmaleta B., 21 Cal. 3d 482, 579 P.2d 514, 523,
146 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1978) (en banc). See also Kirkham v. 4.60
Acres of Land, 100 Idaho 785, 605 P.2d 959, 962 (1980) (court
abuses discretion when it fails to apply the law). ££. Naranio
v. Naranio, 751 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (though
trial court has considerable discretion in adjusting financial
interests of divorced parties, appellate court will overturn
decision if based upon misunderstanding or misapplication of
the law).
In this case, the court based its decision to exclude the
expert's testimony in large part upon its erroneous view that
it was obligated to give the jury per se negligence
instructions. The court stated with our emphasis:
[0]ne of the problems you have is this
jury instruction that says: "If you
violate the law, that's negligence.
That's not what a reasonable person would
do." How does that conform with [expert
testimony that certain behavior is
reasonable] if there is a violation of the
law? . . . It's just inconsistent with
what the jury has to determine. In other
words, even though she may have been
mis[led] and drove across, and the law
says she won't drive across, I have to

tell the jury if she does that,
regardless, she is negligent. So that
would make it inconsistent. I instruct

them, and then [the expert testimony]
would be inconsistent with my
instructions. To me that creates a
doubtful situation; doesn't help the jury
at all[;] just confuses them.
Because the court based its decision to exclude the expert
testimony on a misconception of the law, we hold that the
decision was necessarily an abuse of discretion.
Although we conclude that the court erroneously excluded
the testimony, that error is harmless because the inclusion of
that testimony would not have resulted in a different verdict.
It is true that the court prohibited the expert from
specifically stating his opinion that Gaw's conduct was
reasonable. However, the expert testified at length that the
intersection was very confusing, that many drivers would have
been confused by the intersection, and that Gaw was very likely
confused by the intersection. The obvious conclusion from the
expert's testimony was that Gaw acted reasonably under all the
circumstances. Though the court should not have excluded those
specific words, the message was clearly communicated in the
expert's testimony. Consequently, we hold that even though the
court abused its discretion in excluding the testimony, the
abuse does not constitute reversible error.
JURY INSTRUCTIONS
The trial court, in three jury instructions, advised the
jury that certain actions on the part of a driver constituted
negligence. Gaw argues that these types of "per se" negligence
instructions are inappropriate and constitute reversible
error. We agree with Gaw's position, at least as to one of the
court's instructions, and therefore reverse the trial verdict
against her.
The parties disagree about whether the violation of a
statute or ordinance, such as occurred when Gaw made her
illegal turn onto Highway 6, constitutes "per se" or "prima
facie" negligence in Utah. Their confusion is not surprising
because Utah appellate courts have also occasionally confused
these terms.6 However, though the terminology has been
6. Compare, g^fl. , Joroensen v. Issa, 739 P.2d 80, 82 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987) (using "per se" terminology) with Hall v. Warren, 632
P.2d 848, 850-51 & n.l (Utah 1981) (using "prima facie"
terminology) (cited in Joroensen, 739 P.2d at 82).
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confused, the concept has remained the same and was succinctly
stated in Intermountain Farmers Ass'n v. Fitzgerald, 574 P.2d
1162 (Utah 1978).
[T]he violation of a statute does not
necessarily constitute negligence per se
and may be considered only as evidence of
negligence . . . .
[The violation] may be
regarded as "prima facie evidence of
negligence, but is subject to
justification or excuse . . . ."
Id. at 1164-65 (quoting Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 16 Utah 2d
30, 395 P.2d 62, 64 (1964)) (emphasis added). "Prima facie"
negligence is the correct standard and a trial court commits
prejudicial error when it gives a jury instruction which
provides that the violation of a statute is. negligence without
the possibility for justification or excuse.7 Xci. at 1164.
The trial court in this case did not contemplate that the
standard in Utah is "prima facie." During the trial, at a
conference in chambers, the court stated with our emphasis:
Because one of the problems you have is
that we give this jury an instruction that
says: "If you violate the law, that's
negligence. That's not what a reasonable
person would do." . . . I have to tell the
jury if she [violates the law], she's
negligent.
Based upon this mistaken view of the law, the court gave three
jury instructions which Gaw challenges on appeal.

7. Trial courts need not and probably should not use the
technical term "prima facie" in their jury instructions, at
least not without clear explanation of the term. It is
sufficient to state that the violation of a statute is evidence
of negligence but "subject to justification or excuse if the
evidence is such that it reasonably could be found that the
conduct was nevertheless within the standard of reasonable care
under the circumstances." Thompson v. Ford Motor Co.. 16 Utah
2d 30, 395 P.2d 62, 64 (1964). Moreover, as long as the
concept is clear from the instructions, the terminology used
will not invalidate the instruction.

Instructions 14 and 18 provided:
[Instruction No. 14]: When the law makes
it the duty of a driver of one vehicle to
yield the right of way to a second
vehicle, that duty arises as soon as the
two vehicles are close enough to each
other to constitute an immediate hazard.
Such a hazard exists whenever a reasonably
prudent person in the position of the
driver of the first vehicle, would
apprehend the probability of colliding
with the second vehicle if the driver of
the first vehicle attempted to proceed on
the intended course of travel. Failure to
yield the right of way under such
circumstances is negligence.
[Instruction No. 18]: A vehicle may not
be operated over, across, or within any
painted or other dividing space, median or
barrier of a divided highway, if such
space or median is clearly visible to a
reasonably observant person, except where
authorized by an official traffic control
device or peace officer.
Failure to operate a vehicle in
accordance with the foregoing requirement
of the law is negligence on the part of
the driver.
These instructions, though not framed as -prima facie"
instructions, allowed the jury to consider some limited
justifications and excuses for the conduct which may be a
technical violation of the law. For example, if Gaw could
prove that she reasonably did not apprehend the probability of
the collision when she proceeded into the intersection, her
failure to yield might have been excused under instruction 14.
Moreover, her failure to stay off the median strips and painted
lines might have been excused under instruction 18 if she could
prove that the lines in the intersection were not clearly
visible to the reasonably observant person.
It is easy to envision facts not encompassed by the
language in instructions 14 and 18 which would nevertheless
tend to justify or excuse the prohibited conduct described in
those instructions, making those instructions inappropriate in
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a range of cases. However, the instructions appear, under the
totality of the facts before us, to sufficiently encompass any
justifications and excuses that Gaw actually offered at trial
for her conduct. Consequently, we hold that instructions 14
and 18 were sufficient, if barely so, under the circumstances
of this case.8
Unlike instructions 14 and 18, however, jury instruction
number 17 does not provide for any justification or excuse.
That instruction states:
The operator of a vehicle intending
to turn left shall turn onto the roadway
being entered, in the extreme left hand
available lane for traffic moving in the
new direction of travel.
Failure to operate a vehicle in
accordance with the foregoing requirements
of the law is negligence on the part of
the driver.
If the jury found that Gaw had turned left into any lane other
than the extreme left lane, the jury had to find Gaw negligent
under this instruction. Neither this instruction, nor any other
instruction read in conjunction with this instruction, allowed
the jury to consider justifications or excuses for the improper
turn. This was a strict "per se" instruction and we must
therefore reverse on the basis of this instruction.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Finally, Gaw argues that the court erred when it granted
the state's summary judgment motion. Summary judgment is only
appropriate when the moving party has demonstrated "that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R.
Civ. P. 56(c); Transamerica Cash Res., Inc. v. Dixie Power &
Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24, 25 (Utah 1990). Because a challenge
to summary judgment presents only questions of law, we review
8. Although we hold that instructions 14 and 18 were sufficient
in this case, we do not mean to suggest that they were in any
way ideal instructions which could not be improved upon on
remand to more fully explain the role and range of
justifications and excuses for the proscribed conduct.

the trial court's decision for correctness, id,., and "analyze
the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the
losing party." Provo Citv Corp. v. State, 137 Utah Adv. Rep.
8, 9 (1990),
The trial court gave two reasons for granting the state's
motion. First, it found the affidavits from Gaw's experts were
conclusory and without foundation and therefore did not support
the conclusion that the intersection was faultily designed.
Second, the court found that Gaw had unambiguously stated in
her deposition as initially transcribed that she was not
confused by the intersection. The court refused to consider
the numerous changes she made to her deposition and ordered
them suppressed. The court also refused to consider the
assertions in her subsequent affidavit that she was confused,
concluding she had not adequately explained the discrepancy on
that issue which appeared from her deposition. Consequently,
the court found that the design of the intersection was not a
cause of the accident.
On appeal, Gaw argues that genuine issues exist as to both
the inadequate design of the intersection and to her own
confusion. She argues that the experts' affidavits
sufficiently demonstrated that the intersection was faultily
designed. Moreover, she argues that her original deposition,
her amended deposition, and her affidavit all asserted the
position that she was confused by the intersection and all
should have been considered by the trial court. We now
consider each of these arguments.
A.

Expert Opinion Concerning Faulty Design

The trial court ruled that the affidavits of Gaw's experts
concerning the faulty design of the intersection were
inadequate because they were "without foundation as to the
highway design and they do not specify what standards the State
did not follow or should have followed in this instance," On
appeal, Gaw argues that the court's conclusions were
incorrect. Although we are not sure precisely what the trial
court found missing from the experts' affidavits,9 we hold
9. The court's two stated concerns were that the affidavits
stated "conclusions without foundation as to the highway
design" and that they failed to specify the standards which the
state did not follow. Having reviewed the affidavits, we find
that they contained both of these elements. As to foundation,
both experts identified particular aspects of the intersection
and surrounding area which made the intersection misleading and
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that they adequately complied with the standard we set forth in
American Concept Ins. Co. v. Lochhead, 751 P.2d 271 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988).
In Lochhead, we articulated a standard for determining the
sufficiency of an expert's affidavit in the summary judgment
context. First, we stated that Utah Rule of Evidence 704
allowed the expert to state his opinion concerning the ultimate
issue in the case. Jjl. at 273. We then recognized that "[a]n
expert affidavit must also contain a sufficient factual basis
for the opinion proffered." I£. at 274. See Utah R. Civ. P.
56(e). 10 To determine the extent of the factual basis
required, we looked to Utah Rule of Evidence 703 which allows
an expert to base an opinion on admissible evidence and
inadmissible evidence of the kind that experts in the field
use. l£L. We concluded that the affidavit was sufficient if it
articulated the facts upon which the opinion was based and if
the facts were of the "type usually relied upon by experts in
the field." I£.

(Footnote 9 continued)
dangerous. As to the applicable standard, one expert stated
that the design was "totally in conflict with normal
engineering practices." The other expert identified and quoted
from two publications dealing with highway safety and design.
Consequently, we fail to perceive the deficiencies about which
the trial court was concerned.
10. The rule requiring an expert affiant to state the factual
basis for his or her opinion appears to be at odds with Utah
Rule of Evidence 705, which allows an expert to give his or her
opinion without stating the facts and data upon which he or she
relied. However, Rule 705 also recognizes that the expert may
have to divulge the basis for his or her opinion if the court
requires and if requested upon cross examination. Since an
affiant is not subject to cross examination, it makes some
sense to require the expert affiant to divulge at least part of
the basis for his or her opinion. Stated another way, Utah R.
Civ. P. 56(e)vs explicit requirements that affidavits "be made
on personal knowledge" and "set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence," together with its implicit recognition
that statements in an affidavit must not be conclusory in form,
Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983), and that
affidavits not contain unsubstantiated opinions, Treloaoan v.
Treloaaan, 699 P.2d 747, 748 (Utah 1985) (per curiam), control
in the summary judgment context over Utah R. Evid. 705.

In Lochhead, the expert was a licensed property and
casualty claims manager. Id- at 273- His opinion was that
American Concept had breached its duties of good faith and fair
dealing. Id. That opinion was based upon an examination of
American Concept's adjuster's files. Id- We held that because
the adjuster's files were the type of materials upon which
experts in the field relied, the affidavit was sufficient and,
therefore, we reversed the summary judgment. Id. at 274.
Under the Lochhead analysis, the affidavits in this case
were sufficient. Gaw's experts each averred to be engineers
with some expertise in the area of traffic and/or highway
design. Both experts stated in their affidavits that the
intersection was dangerous and/or failed to meet safety
standards in the industry. The basis for one expert's opinion
was his examination of the intersection siteQ The other expert
based his opinion on a diagram of the intersection, police
reports and photographs, Gaw's deposition, and traffic court
data. Clearly, the facts articulated in the affidavits are the
type relied upon by experts in the field. Thus, we hold that
the affidavits were sufficient and should not have been
disregarded by the trial court. They raise an issue of
material fact as to the negligent design of the intersection.
B.

Evidence that Gaw was Confused by the Intersection

The state argued that even if the intersection was
negligently designed, there was no evidence that Gaw was
actually confused by the intersection and thus the
intersection's design was not a proximate cause of the
accident. The trial court agreed. Gaw argues that her
original deposition, amended deposition, and affidavit all
created an issue of fact concerning her confusion and all
should have been considered by the court. We will treat each
of these three sources separately.
1. Original Deposition
First, Gaw argues that her original deposition alone was
sufficient to raise an issue concerning her confusion. We
disagree. Gaw was repeatedly asked during her initial
deposition whether she was confused 11
by the intersection. She
repeatedly stated that she was not.
11. The following excerpts are illustrative of Gaw's initial
deposition testimony:

onnion

/-»*

i I

The only testimony from her initial deposition relied upon
by Gaw to demonstrate that she was confused by the intersection
is as follows:
Q: Is there anything about the
intersection markings or signs that you
were unable to understand?
A: Well, it was always confusing
there, the way they had the lines going
that way, this way, and which way.
Q:

What was the confusion?

A: Well, you really just had to
watch what you're doing and stay in the
lane and watch where you're going, because
they were always marked crazy.
This testimony only demonstrates that the intersection required
extra attention to successfully navigate it. It does not
demonstrate that Gaw was in fact confused on the day of the
accident, especially in light of her many statements that she
had not been confused. See note 11, supra, and accompanying
text. Thus, we hold that Gaw's initial deposition testimony was

(Footnote 11 continued)
Q: Mrs. Gaw, when you entered the
intersection on the day of the accident,
were you confused by anything?
A: No, cause I had driven that two
or three times or more.

Q: . . . Do you have any memory or
do you feel that you were confused by any
of these lines in this intersection?
A: Not that I remember. There
was—They didn't ever bother me before and
I don't remember.

not sufficient to raise an issue of material fact concerning
whether she was confused on the day of the accident.
2.

Changes to Deposition Testimony

Gaw attempted to change her deposition testimony in over
fifty places. She did so by means of "correction sheets,"
prepared by herself outside the presence of the court reporter
who took the deposition. The reporter filed the sheets along
with the deposition as initially transcribed. Some of the
changes were merely to clarify and to correct typographical
errors but many were substantive. For example, Gaw was asked
during the deposition: "Do you have any memory about whether
or not, at the time of the accident, you were confused by the
lane markings?" In her original deposition, she responded:
"No, I don't." In her corrected answers she stated "Yes, I was
confused for the lines were changed often." A few lines later
she was asked: "That answer you gave to the previous question
is, 'No, You don't know whether you were confused?'" Initially
she responded: "Uh-huh." In her corrected answers she
stated: "Yes I was confused, that place is very confusing to
anyone." Finally, she was asked: "I want to make sure you're
clear on that last question he was asking you. At this time,
okay, do you have any memory or do you feel that you were
confused by any of these lines in this intersection?" She
responded: "Not that I remember. There was—They didn't ever
bother me before, I don't remember." She corrected the
response to state "Yes, it is very confusing for anyone."
Defendants moved to suppress the changes to Gaw's
deposition. The court granted the motion to suppress and
consequently did not consider the changed answers in its
decision to grant the summary judgment motion. The basis for
the court's decision was "that changes to the substance [of]
the deposition testimony were entered by plaintiff upon the
deposition and not by the officer before whom the deposition
was taken as required in Rule 30(e)." On appeal, Gaw asserts
that the court erred in suppressing the deposition changes. We
disagree.
Initially, we note that Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 30(e)
is drafted very broadly to allow "changes in form or substance
which the witness desires to make." Although some commentators
have puzzled over the liberality of this rule, see, e.g.,,
Scully, A Brief History of Deposition Editing, 15 Litigation 43
(Spring 1989), courts have generally not limited the number and
kinds of changes a deponent can make. See, e.g., Lugtig v.
Thomas, 89 F.R.D. 639, 641 (N.D. 111. 1981) (mem.) (69 changes
including many substantive changes); Allen & Co. v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., 49 F.R.D. 337, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (mem.) (377
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changes of which 73 were substantive); De Severskv v. Republic
Aviation Corp. , 2 F.R.D. 113, 114 (E.D.N.Y. 1941) (34
substantive changes). But see Barlow v. Esselte Pendaflex
Corp., 111 F.R.D. 404, 406 (M.D.N.C. 1986) ("manner and number
of changes disclose a lack of good faith"). Thus, though
defendants grouse about the kinds of changes Gaw made to her
deposition testimony, that argument does not support
suppression of the changes.
The question before us is whether the court should have
suppressed the changes for Gaw's failures to comply with the
requirements of Rule 30(e). Rule 30(e) requires that changes
"be entered upon the deposition by the officer with a statement
of the reasons given by the witness for making them." Utah R.
Civ. P. 30(e) .
Although courts have allowed liberal changing of
deposition testimony, they have been fairly strict in requiring
compliance with the technical requirements of Rule 30(e). See,
e.g., Sanford v. CBS, Inc.. 594 F. Supp. 713, 715 (N.D. 111.
1984) (mem.) (requiring specific reasons for each change);
Luatig, 89 F.R.D. at 642 (requiring changes to be written in
deposition after original answer, specific reasons for changes,
and changes to be made by the reporter). That strictness has
been tempered somewhat by the willingness of trial courts to
permit deponents a further opportunity to comply with the
technical requirements of Rule 30(e) rather than simply
striking or suppressing attempted changes not in compliance
with the rule. In Sanford and Luatia the courts required the
deponent to amend the depositions as per the rule, with the
proviso this be done at the deponents* expense. 594 F. Supp at
715; 89 F.R.D. at 642. Moreover, where changes have been
extensive, courts have allowed the opposing party to reopen the
deposition for further examination, costs to be paid by the
deponent whose changes, after all, created the problem. See,
e.g., 594 F. Supp. at 715; 89 F.R.D. at 642. The patience of
trial courts in this regard is not, however, boundless. In
Barlow, the deponent made over a hundred changes to the
deposition, including the deletion of large blocks of the
deposition, and failed to provide any reasons for the changes.
Ill F.R.D. at 406. Moreover, the changes were so extensive
that it was "virtually impossible for the [court] reporter to
enter the changes upon the deposition as he is required to
do." I&. The court found the Barlow deponent's actions to be
"at variance with the letter and spirit of Rule 30(e)" and
declared the attempted changes a "nullity." Id.
The facts before us do not warrant the same remedy reached
by the Barlow court. Although there were numerous changes to

the deposition in this case, many of which were admittedly
substantive, Gaw offered some semblance of a specific reason
for each. The reporter would not have had difficulty entering
them on the deposition. Moreover, the method for making
changes employed by Gaw, while at variance with the clear
requirements of Rule 30(e), was consistent with the reporter's
instructions on the correction sheet given to Gaw.12
Suppression of the changes was a drastic remedy which courts
usually reject in the absence of bad faith.13
12.

The instructions on the correction sheet stated:
After reviewing the transcript of
your deposition, please fill out this
correction sheet indicating any changes
you deem necessary.
This is a verbatim record of what was
actually said and no grammatical
corrections should be made. If there are
corrections or insertions, please initial
the correction sheet and briefly state
your reasons therefor. For example,
spelling error, clarification, transcriber
error, et cetera.
Please do all corrections with
typewriter or black ink.

Complying with the the instructions on this sheet can hardly be
viewed as "bad faith" of the sort which concerned the court in
Barlow. See 111 F.R.D. at 406.
13. The only evidence of bad faith which appears from the
record was the false representation to the court that Gaw was
suffering from an undiagnosed and untreated diabetic condition
during the initial deposition. It is noteworthy that this
excuse was not offered on the correction sheet completed by Gaw
herself nor in her subsequent affidavit, but appears only in
Gaw's memorandum in opposition to defendants' motion to
suppress, which was prepared and signed by counsel. Though we
do not condone such a false representation to the court, it is
better sanctioned under Utah R. Civ. P. 11 where made by an
attorney rather than a party. Such an after-the-fact
mischaracterization by counsel should not be the basis for the
suppression of deposition changes which rule 30(e) so liberally
allows. See also note 12, supra.
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However, Gaw's response to the motion to suppress did not
include, even in the alternative, a request for an opportunity
to comply with the requirements of Rule 30(e) and an offer to
reopen the deposition at her expense. She only argued that she
was entitled to make the changes in the manner she did.
Moreover, on appeal she does not contend she was entitled to
alternative relief but steadfastly continues to argue only that
her changes were validly made despite her non-compliance with
Rule 30(e). The matter being presented in this posture, where
appellant did not seek the more moderate response of the
Sanford and Luotia courts either at the trial court nor on
appeal, we reject her argument that her deposition changes were
properly made and affirm the trial court's decision to suppress
them for failure to comply with Rule 30(e). It follows that
nothing in her corrected answers was effective to create a
factual dispute.
3.

Gaw's Affidavit

Gaw submitted an affidavit, along with her memorandum in
opposition to the state's motion for summary judgment. The
trial court stated that Gaw's deposition demonstrated she was
not confused by the intersection and that "the Court will not
allow her to change those statements by affidavits . . . since
she has offered no explanation as to why she would be mistaken
at the time of the deposition." Gaw asserts that the affidavit
contained an adequate explanation which raised a genuine issue
concerning her confusion. We agree.
The general rule in Utah is that an affiant may not "raise
an issue of fact by his own affidavit which contradicts his
deposition, unless he can provide an explanation of the
discrepancy." Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1173 (Utah
1983). In Webster, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed a summary
judgment because the contradictory affidavit "wholly failed to
explain the discrepancy between the deposition and the
affidavit." Id.
In this case, unlike Webster, Gaw did not wholly fail to
explain the discrepancy. According to the affidavit, she had
previously thought, including at her deposition, that she was
turning into the merge lane of the highway and not into the
through lane as was ultimately established. She thought she
was properly following the lines through the intersection. She
thought the lines had taken her correctly into the merge lane.
Moreover, she assumed that the accident had occurred in the
merge lane. At her deposition, she understood the questions to

reflect these same assumptions, responded to them under these
assumptions, and accordingly had no subjective sense of being
confused. Only later, according to defendant, did she discover
her assumptions were incorrect and that she had actually driven
into the through lane meaning to have driven into the merge
lane. Therefore, at her deposition, she truly did not believe
that she was confused by the intersection, although obviously
she was thoroughly confused, having completely misapprehended
her route of travel and what lane she ended up in.1^
This case is similar to the case of Kennett-Murrav Corp.
v. Bone, 622 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1980). In Bone, there was a
discrepancy between the affiant's affidavit and his earlier
deposition. The court noted that the "affidavit did not
purport to raise a new matter, but rather to explain certain
aspects of his deposition testimony." i£l. at 894. Namely, the
affiant explained that certain responses were given under the
mistaken assumption that the questions concerned one document
when they in fact concerned another. The court was satisfied
with the explanation in the affidavit because it was "at least
plausible." I&. ££. Camfield Tires, Inc. v. Michelin Tire
Corp., 719 F.2d 1361, 1364-65 (8th Cir. 1983) (opposite result
reached where "affidavit was inherently inconsistent with his
prior deposition [and] not plausible").

14. Gaw's human factors expert gave at trial the following
explanation for Gaw's confusion and the discrepancy in the
deposition:
[A] person can be mis[led], in which case
they're not aware. And if they're not
aware they're mis[led], that in that sense,
they're really not confused . . . .
[S]omeone on the outside looking at what
happened [would say]: "Well, if she did
that, it's very likely she was confused but
didn't know it." You see, that's the
difference. I'm more comfortable with the
term 'mis[led],' than I am 'confused;'
because some connotations of the word
'confused' would indicate that the person
was aware they were confused. But—
There's some differences between those two
terms.
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Although the trial court in this case apparently did not
believe Gaw's explanation for the discrepancies, we find her
explanation is not inherently inconsistent with the responses
in her initial deposition*15 We do not have to be persuaded
by the explanation or even find it compelling. As long as it
is plausible, the fact finder should be allowed to weigh the
credibility of the explanation. See Tippens v. Celotex Corp.,
805 F.2d 949, 953 (11th Cir. 1986) ("A definite distinction
must be made between discrepancies which create transparent
shams and discrepancies which create an issue of
credibility.M). Gaw's affidavit raised a genuine issue of fact
concerning whether she was confused by the intersection.
C.

Summary

The trial court erred in granting the state's summary
judgment motion. The expert affidavits adequately raised a
genuine issue of fact concerning the negligent design of the
highway. Gaw's affidavit raised an issue of fact concerning
whether Gaw was in fact confused by the intersection. The
credibility of Gaw's final position was one for the trier of
fact and not properly disposed of on summary judgment. We

15. Many of Gaw's deposition responses are consistent with the
explanation in her affidavit of the apparent discrepancies.
The following exchange is illustrative:
Q: On the date of the accident, did
you use that merge lane?
A: Well, I always did before, but,
sir, I don't know. I can't remember
whether I went there or what. I pulled
out into the center and he was coming and
I stopped. That's it. I don't remember
after that. I wish to God I did.
Q: What you are telling me, then, is
you do not know whether you used the merge
lane that you used on prior occasions in
driving this same route on the day of the
accident?
A: I always had before, so why would
I change it for one time?

accordingly reverse the summary judgment and remand for a trial
or other appropriate proceedings.
CONCLUSION
Although the court should have allowed Gaw's human factors
expert to testify on the reasonableness of Gaw's conduct prior
to the accident, the error was not prejudicial because the
expert effectively conveyed his message even without using
those magic words. The trial court gave jury instructions
under the mistaken assumption that the violation of a statute
or ordinance constitutes negligence "per se." It was
reversible error to give an instruction to that effect.
Finally, the trial court improperly granted the state's summary
judgment motion because material issues of fact existed
concerning the negligent design of the intersection and
concerning whether Gaw was in fact confused by the intersection.
We reverse and remand for a new trial or other proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

Gregory K. Orme, Judge

WE CONCUR:

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

jV Robert Bullock, Judge
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raised are waived. It logically follows that
the availability of a petition for rehearing
should not be implied from the absence of
any express prohibition in the statute, and
we reject plaintiffs contention to that effect
[4] The jurisdiction of the Industrial
Commission over workers' compensation
cases is fixed by statute, as is this Court's
jurisdiction over judicial review of the Commission's orders. See Schockmeyer v. Industrial Commission, 23 Utah 2d 346, 463
P.2d 562 (Utah 1970); see also 3 Larson,
Workmen's Compensation Law, § 80.52(a)
(1986). Based upon our reading of the
review provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-1-82.51 et seq. and case law under the
former statutory provisions, we conclude
that the commission had no jurisdiction to
consider the Petition for Reconsideration of
Denial of Motion to Review.7 The time for
filing a petition for writ of review with this
Court began to run on November 20, 1986,
the date of notice of the order of the commission disposing of the case on the merits.8 No petition for writ of review was
filed within thirty days of the date of notice
of the order as required by Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-1-83 (1986). This Court is without
jurisdiction to review the final order of the
commission because plaintiffs petition for
writ of review was not timely filed. Plaintiffs petition for writ of review is, accordingly, dismissed.
BENCH, BILLINGS and DAVIDSON,
JJ., concur.
(O
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7. As in the Ferguson case, although the proceed*
ings subsequent to November 20, 1986 were
without authority, they did not change the result
previously reached. 221 P. at 1099. The November 20, 1986 order is the final order of the
commission for purposes of seeking judicial review.
•

fT^h r^H* Ann. $ 35-1-82.56 (1986) provides:

Neil JORGENSEN, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
T.

Allen ISSA, dba Allen's TV &
Electronics, Defendant and
Respondent
No. 860012-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
July 1, 1987.
Tractor trailer owner brought negligence action against motorist, seeking
damages allegedly sustained when tractor
trailer overturned. The District Court,
Sevier County, Don V. Tibbs, J., entered
judgment on verdict finding each party 50%
negligent, and owner appealed. The Court
of Appeals, Greenwood, J., held that
court's instructions adequately set out
owner's theory of case.
Affirmed.

1. Trial «=»203(1)
A party is entitled to have the jury
instructed on his theory of the case.
2. Appeal and Error «»1067
Trial *»268
Failure to give requested instructions
is reversible error if it tends to mislead the
jury to the prejudice of the complaining
party or insufficiently or erroneously advises the jury of the law.
3. Appeal and Error *=»1067
It is not prejudicial error to fail to use
specific requested jury instructions if the
substance of the requested instructions is
covered in the instructions given.
of the entry of any administrative law judge's
order or any order or award of the commission.
The mailing of the copy of said order or award
to the last known address shown in the files of
the commission or any party in interest and to
the attorneys or agents of record in the case, if
any, shall be deemed to be notice of said order."
The November 20, 1986 order reflects that it
*»«« mailed to plaintiff on the same date.

JORGENSEN v. ISSA
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4. Trial s=>228(3), 267(1)
In light of the entitlement of a party to
have the jury instructed on his theory of a
case, the basic theory espoused must be
explained to the jury in ordinary, concise
and understandable language, although the
exact requested language need not be given.
5. Negligence *=>6, 12
Violation of a statute or ordinance is
negligence per se, which may be excused if
the negligent actor is confronted with an
emergency not his own fault
6. Trial «=»251(3), 260(7)
Trial court's refusal of plaintiffs proposed instructions that violation of statute
or duty might be subject to excuse or justification, in action concerning vehicle accident, was not error, since there was no
indication that plaintiff violated statute and
court's other instructions, describing nonstatutory duty of reasonable care and sudden emergency doctrine, adequately set out
plaintiffs theory of the case.

Before GREENWOOD, DAVIDSON
and JACKSON, JJ.
OPINION
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Plaintiff, Neil Jorgensen, brought an action against Allen Issa to recover damages
incurred when plaintiffs tractor trailer
overturned while rounding a curve on U.S.
Highway 89 in Joseph, Utah. The jury
found plaintiff and defendant each 50 percent negligent On appeal plaintiff claims
the trial court erred by refusing to allow a
jury instruction that negligence might be
subject to excuse or justification.

Ray Ivie, Provo, for defendant and respondent

On December 28, 1981, plaintiffs son,
Todd Jorgensen, was driving a tractor trailer loaded with approximately 287 sheep.
As he rounded a curve in the road his
tractor trailer overturned and slid on its
side killing 150 sheep. At trial plaintiff
claimed defendant was driving towards
Todd straddling the center yellow lime preparing to make a left turn. Plaintiff claims
his son swerved to avoid defendant and the
tractor trailer (overturned. At trial the
court gave instructions 12 l and 12A *, addressing the reasonable person standard
and the sudden emergency doctrine respectively. However, the jury was not given
plaintiffs instruction 10, which stated as
follows:

1. Instruction 12:
It was the duty of a driver of a vehicle to use
reasonable care under the circumstances in
driving his vehicle to avoid danger to himself
and others and to observe and be aware of the
condition of the highway, the traffic thereon,
and other existing conditions; in regard, he was
obliged to observe due care in respect to:
A. To use reasonable care to keep a lookout
for other vehicles, or other conditions reasonably to be anticipated.
B. To keep his vehicle under reasonably
[sic] safe and proper control.
C. To drive at such speed as was safe, reasonable and prudent under the circumstances,
having due regard to the width, surface and
condition of the highway, the traffic thereon,
the visibility, and any actual or potential hazards then existing.
D. To keep a lookout for persons or vehicles
upon the highway, and whenever it appears to
be reasonably necessary in the exercise of due

care for the safety of others, to sound the
horn, to warn others for their safety.
Failure to operate his vehicle in accordance
with the foregoing requirements of the law
would constitute negligence on his part.
2. Instruction 12A:
A person, who without negligence on his part,
is suddenly and unexpectedly confronted with
peril arising from either the actual presence or
the appearance of imminent danger to himself
or to others is not expected nor required to use
the same judgment and prudence that may be
required of him in calmer and more deliberate
moments.
In such a situation, his duty is to exercise only
the degree of care which an ordinary prudent
person would exercise under the same or similar circumstances. If, at that moment, he exercises such care, he does all the law requires of
him, even though in light of after-events, it
might appear that a different choice and man*
ner of action would have been better and safer.

Arthur H. Nielsen, Earl Jay Peck, Clark
R. Nielsen, Nielsen & Senior, Salt Lake
City, for plaintiff and appellant
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If you find from a preponderance of the
evidence that either driver in this case
conducted himself in violation of any
statute or duty I have read to you, then
such conduct constituted negligence on
his part
A violation of such a statute or duty by a
driver may be subject to justification or
excuse if the driver's conduct can nevertheless be reasonably said to fall within
the standard of reasonable care under
the circumstances. The following facts
may be considered in determining whether a driver is excused or justified in
violating a statute or duty:
a. The driver is unable after reasonable
diligence or care to comply with the
statute or duty; or
b. He is confronted by an emergency
which was not caused by his own misconduct; or
c Compliance would involve a greater
risk of harm to the driver or to others.
[1-4] The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in failing to submit
instruction 10 to the jury. A party is clearly entitled to have the jury instructed on
his theory of the case. Watters v. Querry,
626 P.2d 455, 458 (Utah 1981); Black v.
Knight, 562 P.2d 621, 622 (Utah 1977);
Hall v. Blackham, 18 Utah 2d 164,168, 417
P.2d 664, 666 (1966). Failure to give requested instructions is reversible error if it
tends to mislead the jury to the prejudice
of the complaining party or insufficiently
or erroneously advises the jury on the law.
In re Estate of Kesler, 702 P.2d 86, 96
(Utah 1985). However, it is not prejudicial
error to fail to use specific instructions if
the substance of the requested instructions
is covered in the instructions given. Stratum v. Nielsen, 25 Utah 2d 124, 126, 477
P.2d 152, 153 (1970). The exact language
need not be given but the basic theory
espoused must be explained to the jury in
ordinary, concise and understandable language. Gilhe8pie v. DeJong, 520 P.2d 878,
880 (Utah 1974).
In this case plaintiffs theory was that if
the jury found Todd Jorgensen negligent
by failing to keep the truck under reasonably safe and proper control, by driving too

fast for the curve, or by failing to keep a
lookout for other vehicles, that negligence
was excused or justified when he was confronted with an emergency, i.e., defendant's vehicle straddling the center line. On
appeal plaintiff contends that this theory
was not adequately explained to the jury
due to the judge's failure to read instruction 10 to the jury.
[5, 6] Plaintiffs contention fails for two
reasons. First, it is well established that
violation of a statute or ordinance is negligence per se which may be excused if the
negligent actor is confronted with an emergency not his own fault. Hall v. Warren,
632 P.2d 848, 851 (Utah 1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288A
(1965). In order for plaintiffs excuse or
justification theory to apply, a standard of
safety set by statute or ordinance must
have been violated. In this case, the jurywas not instructed on and the facts do not
indicate that plaintiff violated a statute or
ordinance. The only statutory violation the
jury was instructed on involved defendant
Second, instructions 12 and 12A gave the
jury the appropriate standards for determining whether or not appellant was negligent Instruction 12 describes the nonstatutory duty to "use reasonable care under
the circumstances" and instruction 12A
correctly states the sudden emergency doctrine. These instructions were sufficient to
fairly and completely present appellant's
theory of the case. The jury, pursuant to
those instructions, apparently found that
under the circumstances appellant was negligent in failing to reasonably keep his
vehicle under control and/or maintain a
reasonably safe speed. The finding of
negligence took into account, as part of the
circumstances, that appellant was suddenly
confronted with defendant's vehicle straddling the center line.
Affirmed.
DAVIDSON and JACKSON, JJ.,
concur.

